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Abstract 
Silence (And Its Voluble Partner) 
Silence may traditionally have been golden, but how is it valued today? Can it survive the impact of a 
technology which can, and does, bring the apparently irresistible seductions of noise to the remotest 
parts of the world, and which invades the most reclusive aspects of our lives? And what place has 
silence in a culture such as ours which classifies it as "unproductive"? 
But what is silence anyway? 
Professor Taylor considers two ways in which, from the Romantic period onward, silence has been 
conceived. One tradition equates silence with Truth itself; the other considers it the condition which 
enables Truth to become manifest. In contrast, today's technology brings about a devaluation of silence 
by making it easy to avoid. This has profound consequences for the conception of Thought which, until 
recently, has been characteristic of the Western intellectual tradition. 
The consequences of this change, and their implications for the teaching and study of literature and for 
university education in general, are then considered. 
The great Irish poet William Butler Yeats once remarked to the effect that in times of emotional stress 
and upheaval the natural tendency of people is not to achieve a burst of eloquence, but to fall silent. If 
this should be the case even for that most eloquent of people, the Irish, how much more so, on this 
occasion, for myself, an Australian of almost pure Scottish ancestry. Neither Scots nor Australians, after 
all, are noted for their ready flow of words, even at the most propitious of times. 
Yeats also started one of his most moving late poems with the lines: "I sought a theme and sought for 
it in vain, I I sought it daily for six weeks or so" ("The Circus Animals' Desertion"). That certainly 
seemed to apply to my case too, but not the rest of the poem, I hope, which continues: "Maybe at last, 
being but a broken man, I I must be satisfied with my heart" and concludes: "Now that my ladder's 
gone, I I must lie down where all the ladders start, I In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart". It 
seemed inadvisable to pursue the appropriateness of this poem to my situation beyond the first two 
lines, in case Edith Cowan University began to have second thoughts about employing me. Besides, 
Yeats wrote these lines in the last year of his life, when he was seventy-three and in his full powers. I 
have still some time to go before retiring, and hope to reach my full powers before I do so. 
Nonetheless, on such a formal occasion as an Inaugural Lecture, it is much more pleasant being a 
member of the silent majority, the audience, than it is to be up here. And it is by no means easy to find 
an appropriate theme. So I was quite pleased when it occurred to me that, as I am a Professor of 
English, silence would be not only oddly suitable but even, perhaps, unexpected. However, I was a 
little less pleased when it was pointed out to me that I could not possibly stand, John Cage-like, silent 
in front of you for fifty minutes, but would actually have to say something about silence. So that is what 
I intend to do now. 
But, of course, the very act of talking about silence reveals both silence's inadequacy and its strange 
complicity with language. Silence, as the saying goes, is golden. I interpret this aphorism as indicative 
that silence, as a paradoxical "speech act" (Searle, 1969) endowed with value, does not adequately 
speak for itself. Silence, if it is to proclaim its value, has to be represented by us. One might say that 
this golden eloquence of silence has to be translated or interpreted: strangely, it does not speak our 
tongue. Like an infant or a foreigner, its very muteness has to be spoken, has to be transgressed, in 
order to become apparent. And it is in that moment of transgression, when speech utters what silence 
cannot, when silence passes over, you might say, into speech and realises itself in the act of becoming 
what it is not, that the potency of silence is manifest. The potency of silence, it is revealed, is to enable 
speech and language in general-what I have called its voluble partner. 
For several years after I left school I was haunted by a poem which I had come across in that famous 
school text, James Reeves' The Poet's World. The poem goes (in part) like this: 
Only a man harrowing clods 
In a slow silent walk 
With an old horse that stumbles and nods 
Half asleep as they stalk. 
Only thin smoke without flame 
From the heaps of couch-grass; 
Yet these will go onward the same 
Though dynasties pass. 
(1-8) 
These are, of course, the first two stanzas of Thomas Hardy's "In Time of 'The Breaking of Nations'" 
written in 1915 (the date is important). Hardy was wrong about the horse, which has been replaced in 
most parts of the world today by a tractor, with the accompanying noise that a tractor makes. Yet 
Hardy's poem, with its unobtrusive but unmistakeable stress on the significance of silence or, in the last 
stanza, "whispering" (that is, a speech intimately complicit with silence), seemed to me for many years 
to exemplify a truth that it thematises: that the endurance of humanity is to be found in the small, the 
unobtrusive, the homely and the silent, rather than in the noise and rhetoric of "Dynasties". Dynasties 
may-indeed will-pass, but these small and silent acts "will go onward the same". Today, however, I 
am not so sure. 
It would be a fascinating project to do for silence what silence cannot do for itself, that is, to write its 
history. Clearly that is beyond the scope of this lecture, and the difficulties of such a project have been 
formulated by Jacques Derrida ( 1978) in his essay "Cogito and the History of Madness". But if we go 
back even only so far as the Romantic period, to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, one 
can see silence emerge from the relative obscurity with which it endured the previous century in order 
to occupy a position of honour on the Romantic stage, a stage which it shared with such other Romantic 
inventions as the Imagination, the Individual, Nationalism, Liberty, and perhaps Feminism. In fact, in 
a couple of ways which I can look at only briefly, one could claim that silence actually occupied the 
central position, either as Ideal referent or as ground, of much that we consider Romanticism today. 
Why should I talk about Romanticism in this context? My justification is that a great deal of what we 
think of as modern thought assumed its familiar shape during the Romantic period, exerting a formative 
but sometimes underestimated influence over the establishment of Modernism and whatever has come 
since. Also, assuming intellectual force in the United States only after Romanticism's decline in Britain 
in the 1830s, an American Romanticism, in the guise of Transcendentalism, extended well into the 
second half of the nineteenth century. It is worth pondering on the thought that, when that pre-eminent 
exemplar of American Romanticism, the poet Walt Whitman, died in 1892, the Modernist poets 
W. B. Yeats, Robert Frost, Wallace Stevens, William Carlos Williams, Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot had 
all been born. Students of the literature of England have tended to overlook the significance of this 
point. This trans-Atlantic continuity of a Romanticism, which had assimilated certain Puritan and 
Enlightenment values along the way, also explains a great deal about the current uses and abuses of 
American political rhetoric: whether it be the rhetoric of the Cold War, the Gulf War or the recent 
Presidential campaign. But that is another subject which, like so many others, is outside the scope of 
this lecture. Nonetheless I hope that what I have said indicates the significance of Romanticism for the 
discursive, cultural and political exigencies of the last decade of the twentieth century and beyond. It 
might therefore be both instructive and useful to see what the Romantics meant by silence, that is, to 
see how silence is constructed within Romantic discourse. In doing this, we can see the value or values 
the Romantics ascribed to silence. 
* * * 
We could do no better, since I am talking about the English Romantic poets here, than to start with 
Wordsworth. I am sure that everyone here knows his famous sonnet known as "Upon Westminster 
Bridge" (which is not, incidentally, its true title). Wordsworth's sonnet is an extraordinary celebration 
of the city of London, a city which William Blake had damned so resoundingly in his poem, "London", 
only eight years before. Perhaps, in fact, we should look at Blake's poem first. Blake's "London" is one 
in which anguished noise predominates: the speaker "marks" "every cry of every man", "every Infant's 
cry of fear", "the Chimney-sweeper's cry" and "the hapless Soldier's cry". And the last stanza of Blake's 
poem reads: 
But most thro' midnight streets I hear 
How the youthful Harlot's curse 
Blasts the new-born Infant's tear, 
And blights with plagues the Marriage hearse. 
(16-20) 
The youthful Harlot's curse may well be venereal disease, but it is also malediction which can be heard, 
as can the other noises, the cries of anguish and outrage, in the poem. 
In contrast to Blake's "London", Wordsworth's London early in the morning of September 3, 1802, is 
silent. Quite explicitly, the poem states that: 
This City now doth, like a garment, wear 
The beauty of the morning; silent, bare, 
Ships, towers, domes, theaters, and temples lie 
Open unto the fields, and to the sky; 
All bright and glittering in the smokeless air. 
(4-8) 
It is a poem shot through with contradictions. You have probably already noticed how the city is bare, 
yet wearing "the beauty of the morning" like a garment, the garment of nakedness. And the beauty of 
London is celebrated at the moment in which its "mighty heart is lying still", as though it were some 
wondrous corpse. The point of the poem, as I read it, is that at this moment early on a warm autumn 
morning the city has died as a city, to become transfigured as Nature. Just as Wordsworth's river, which 
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"glideth at his own sweet will" contrasts with Blake's "charter'd Thames", so too does the silence of 
Wordsworth's London contrast with the noise of Blake's. In Wordsworth's sonnet, silence is the figure 
of the transfiguration of the human to the natural, of the social to the spiritual, of the historical to the 
eternal, of the contingent to the true. Truth, in other words, speaks by means of silence. Or to put that 
the other way round, silence is truth uttering itself. 
Another poem by Wordsworth, "Resolution and Independence", marks a similar congruence of truth 
and silence. The poem's narrator encounters an old man gathering leeches for sale to doctors in a 
remote part of the country. He is described as being like a stone, and when the narrator quizzes him 
about his life and livelihood, he answers so quietly that the narrator has to ask him again: "The old Man 
still stood talking by my side; I But now his voice to me was like a stream I Scarce heard; nor word from 
word could I divide" (106-108). The poem ends with the narrator envisioning the old man "Wandering 
about alone and silently" (131). Yet the old man's silence has uttered the precepts of the poem's title, 
which are not actually articulated in words spoken in the poem itself, that is, resolution and 
independence. Again silence is valorised as that which transcends the contingent. 
There is a long tradition which identifies silence with the utterance of truth. It stretches back to the 
ancient Mysteries and finds expression in the notion of the Ineffable: that truth which cannot take the 
form of words. That truth has been represented graphically as the intersection of lines at the centre of 
the Mandala, the unseen centre from which the lines also radiate. It is represented by the light which 
illuminates, but not to the eye, of Medieval mystics and of the conclusion of Dante's La Divina 
Commedia. In Australia, it is actually invoked in a poem by John Shaw Neilson titled "The Orange 
Tree". Neilson's poem was written early this century. In it, a man persistently questions a young girl 
who seems preoccupied with something else. The man tries, by a series of increasingly intrusive 
questions, to descry what the girl is thinking about. The poems ends in this way: 
he asks. 
Is it a fluttering heart that gave 
Too willingly and was reviled? 
Is it the stammering at a grave, 
The last word of a little child? 
- Silence! the young girl said. Oh, why, 
Why will you talk to weary me? 
Plague me no longer now, for I 
Am listening like the Orange Tree. 
(33-40) 
But in Australian writing, probably the most explicit celebration of silence as truth speaking is found in 
David Malouf's wonderful novel, An Imaginary Life. 
An Imaginary Life is the fictionalised account of the Latin poet Ovid's exile in Pontus on the Black Sea, 
close to present-day Constanza in Romania. Exiled from Rome and its Sydney-like sophistication and 
intrigue-exiled too from the Latin language upon which, as a poet, his reputation was built-Ovid 
climbs down, you could say, the linguistic ladder. He learns the basic, earthy language of the people 
among whom he has been exiled. But below that is another rung, another language. As age advances 
upon him and Rome's labyrinthine and power-riddled distinctions became a fading memory, Ovid 
yearns towards a language which is not a language, but "a language beyond tongues" (63). Like the 
language of Wordsworth's leech gatherer, which "was like a stream I Scarce heard; nor word from word 
could I divide", Ovid approaches and enters into a language which does not "define and divide" (98) 
as Latin, or any other spoken or written language, does. Guided by a Wild Child who has been brought 
up by animals and who has never learned human speech, Ovid sets out on a journey towards a death 
which is a reunion with the pre-verbal state of infancy and an affirmation of wholeness. As Ovid says 
in Malouf's novel, "The true language, I know now, is that speech in silence in which we first 
communicated, the Child and I" (97). It may be worth recalling, at this point, that the Latin etymology 
of infant means "unable to speak": the infant is the Child who has not yet "fallen" into the world of 
language. 
An Imaginary Life was published in 1978, and bears eloquent testimony to the vitality of the tradition 
which equates truth with silence, while testifying to the fact that, if silence were left to itself, nobody 
would ever hear it. This tradition expresses a form of Idealism which Christianity and its notion of the 
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Fall perpetuated, but which can be traced back to Plato. Jacques Derrida (1981a) does just that in his 
essay, "Plato's Pharmacy", which examines Plato's famous parable, in the Phaedrus, of the privileging 
of the spoken over the written word. Translating Plato's hierarchy-rather brutally and over-simply, I 
must confess-into the terms of the linguistic ladder I erected within Malouf's novel, Latin is the written 
word, the language of political power and manipulation. It is a language which divides: and its 
combination of power and divisiveness spells out Ovid's sentence: exile. The language of the tribe Ovid 
is exiled among has no written form, and is the spoken word, the language of work, the land, the family, 
community: that which belongs together. And the unspoken language, "that speech in silence", is Truth 
itself. 
* * * 
At this point it might be tempting to ask just why silence and truth have been equated in this way, 
especially in the light of recent analyses of the relation of discourse to power. The answers to this 
question are numerous and various. Derrida ( 1981 b) would suggest that silence signifies what speech 
cannot accomplish, that is, a fullness or plenitude of presence, what is felt as Truth. Derrida argues that 
this presence is always not quite within our grasp, and our sense of it, to use Emmanual Kant's term, 
is a "transcendental illusion" (33), a "lure" (22). 
Feminist and Marxist theoreticians have analysed the power of language, and the way that the control 
of a discourse extends to the exercise of political power. They have also, of course, demonstrated how 
discourse can be controlled. But while Marxists say little-remain quiet, you might say-about silence, 
there is a branch of Feminist thought which sees in silence a non-lexical, pre-Oedipal figuration, what 
Julia Kristeva (1974) calls the Semiotic, which predates and evades the strictures of patriarchal 
discourse. Psychoanalytically, silence utters that sense of undividedness that David Malouf's Ovid 
yearns toward, that is, of being undivided within oneself, and undivided from what surrounds one. This 
is what the infant experiences, before its growing maturation and the Oedipal drama compel it to have 
recourse to the mediation of language to negotiate the growing gap between itself and its world. But the 
adult does not totally lose that sense of undividedness, and hankers back to it, as Ovid does. Or as 
does the speaker in the poem, "The Other Half", by the Australian poet Judith Wright. Addressing her 
"other half", she acknowledges that: 
Yet there's a word that I would give to you: 
the truth you tell in your dumb images 
my daylight self goes stumbling after too. 
So we may meet at last, and meeting bless, 
and turn into one truth in singleness. 
The word is subsumed into a silence which is Truth itself. 
(11-15) 
My question was: why has silence been equated with truth? Why has there been such a long 
tradition-at least two and a half thousand years of logocentrism, according to Derrida-which 
privileges silence as a truth which speech can only approach? 
The answer, I think, is embarrassingly simple. Speech is not good enough. I do not mean that our 
linguistic competence is not adequate to the tasks that confront it, although of course all of us know 
moments when it is not. That is not the point. The point is-as Lacan (1977) argued-that language 
is the index of the divided subject: that is, the subject which is divided from the world about it, as well 
as divided internally: as, for example, consciousness is divided from the unconscious, or as the subject 
thinking about itself is divided from the "self" the subject is thinking about. So long as language is the 
condition of that "fall"-and it always must be-an Edenic silence lures us back to the pre-verbal infant 
state and its blissful unawareness of the human condition. 
* * * 
I said earlier that one could claim that silence actually occupied the central position of much that we 
consider Romanticism today in a couple of ways. We have looked at one of them, that is, at how a 
Romantic identification of silence with truth remains a powerful trope in contemporary writing. In that 
tradition, silence and language are opposites: silence utters what speech cannot. But there is another 
way in which the Romantics figured silence, and that is not as truth itself, but as a ground for the 
production of speech. In this tradition, speech utters what silence cannot, and they are necessary 
partners. 
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Again, this sense that silence is productive does not start with the Romantics. I can recall, again from 
my schooldays, the passage in Book II of Virgil's Aeneid, where the Greeks have pretended to abandon 
their attempts to capture Troy, and have sailed off, leaving their Wooden Horse behind them. Later 
that night, after the Trojans have fallen asleep, exhausted by their celebrations, the Greeks row 
stealthily back "per arnica silentia lunae" (11.255): through the friendly (or complicit) silence of the 
moon. And one can never forget Cordelia's courageous and stubborn silence in Act I of King Lear, and 
Lear's angry response, "Nothing will come of nothing" (I.i.90). Like the Trojans celebrating the retreat 
of the Greeks, Lear, of course, was disastrously wrong. In both The Aeneid and King Lear, silence 
produces what turns out to look remarkably like destiny. 
For an equally stern, but much more positive, account of the productivity of silence, we can go again to 
Wordsworth. (It is as though Wordsworth were anticipating his American admirer, Walt Whitman, who 
proclaimed cheerfully, "Do I contradict myself? I Very well then I contradict myself, I [I am vast. I 
contain multitudes]") ("Song of Myself", 1324-6). Book I of Wordsworth's long poem, The Prelude 
(1979), describes his childhood and the stern moral lessons that Nature administered, teaching him, 
among other things, not to pinch other people's birds out of traps, nor to steal boats at night. The 
famous passage is far too long to quote by way of illustration, but behind these lessons is a silence, a 
silence which is Nature's. Nature's silence is not truth itself, but that which allows Nature to speak, 
and the child to listen. 
Wordsworth wrote Book I of The Prelude in the same year as he wrote Tintern Abbey. In Tintern Abbey, 
he pays tribute to the morally and psychologically beneficial power-not so much of Nature itself, but 
of the ability to recall Nature, to recollect Nature in Nature's absence, that is, "in lonely rooms, and 
'mid the din I Of towns and cities" (24-25). The silence of recollection contrasts with the surrounding 
"din", and is the basis for a remarkable claim. The "beauteous forms" of the Wye River, dwelling now 
in the silence of the recollecting mind, are able, so the poem tells us, to induce 
that blessed mood, 
In which the burthen of the mystery, 
In which the heavy and the weary weight 
Of all this unintelligible world, 
Is lightened. 
In this blessed mood of silence, the poem continues: 
we are laid asleep 
In body, and become a living soul; 
While with an eye made quiet by the power 
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy, 
We see into the life of things. 
(37-41) 
(45-49) 
I am labouring to divide here what Wordsworth somewhat fruitfully confuses. My purpose is to indicate 
that in this passage silence is not truth itself, but the condition under which truth, "the life of things", 
is manifest. Perhaps a clearer example would be that passage in Coleridge's "The Ancient Mariner" 
where, unable to die, the Mariner watches the water snakes cavorting, as water snakes tend to do, in 
the shadow of a ship where all but one of the crew is dead: 
Within the shadow of the ship 
I watched their rich attire: 
Blue, glossy green, and velvet black, 
They coiled and swam; and every track 
Was a flash of golden fire. 
0 happy living things! no tongue 
Their beauty might declare: 
A spring of love gushed from my heart, 
And I blessed them unaware: 
Sure my kind saint took pity on me, 
And I blessed them unaware. 
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The self-same moment I could pray; 
And from my neck so free 
The Albatross fell off, and sank 
Like lead into the sea. 
(277-291) 
There goes, Wordsworth might say, the heavy and the weary weight of all this unintelligible world! My 
point here, though, is that the dreadful silence the Mariner had to endure in the face of his dead 
comrades gives way to a silence in which "no tongue" becomes capable of declaring the beauty of 
nature. This silence leads to involuntary adoration ("I blessed them unaware") and then to speech ("I 
could pray"). The Mariner's ability to pray eventually leads him to a street in England where he 
"stoppeth one of three" and tells his story. Silence is not the end of speech, the Beyond of speech, as 
in that other Romantic figuration of it, but that out of which speech-and further speech-proceeds. 
Perhaps the clearest Romantic declaration of this is the opening of Keats's "Ode on a Grecian Urn". 
The urn is addressed as 
Thou still unravished bride of quietness 
Thou foster child of silence and slow time ... 
The Urn itself speaks in the present tense of visual representation: it will give no answer to the questions 
addressed to it concerning the past, such as "What little town .. .is emptied of this folk, this pious morn?" 
But the Urn's very taciturnity produces speech, which is the Ode itself, an enigmatic meditation on 
truth. 
Let me jump now 120 years to 1939, on the verge of the outbreak of war. And let's listen to a poem by 
W. B. Yeats, this one, like "The Circus Animals' Desertion", written in the year of his death. It is called 
"Long-Legged Fly", and I would like to read it to you in full. 
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That civilization may not sink, 
Its great battle lost, 
Qpiet the dog, tether the pony 
To a distant post; 
Our master Caesar is in the tent 
Where the maps are spread, 
His eyes fixed upon nothing, 
A hand under his head. 
Like a long-legged ~y upon the stream 
His mind moves upon silence. 
That the topless towers be burnt 
And men recall that face, 
Move most gently if move you must 
In this lonely place. 
She thinks, part woman, three parts a child, 
That nobody looks; her feet 
Practise a tinker shuffle 
Picked up on a street. 
Like a long-legged ~y upon the stream 
Her mind moves upon silence. 
That girls at puberty may find 
The first Adam in their thought, 
Shut the door of the Pope's chapel, 
Keep those children out. 
There on that scaffolding reclines 
Michael Angelo. 
With no more sound than the mice make 
His hand moves to and fro. 
Like a long-legged ~y upon the stream 
His mind moves upon silence. 
Civilisation, courage, beauty, innocence, sexuality, culture, art: according to Yeats's poem, they are all 
produced out of silence. They are all sustained by silence. 
What happens if silence disappears? 
* * * 
I have mentioned already the tractor that replaced Hardy's "Old horse that stumbles and nods". Hardy 
himself wrote memorably, in The Mayor of Casterbridge ( 1958: 168) and Tess of the d'Urbervilles (1965: 
365-376), of the mechanisation of rural life. D. H. Lawrence (1958: 11-13) starts his novel, The 
Rainbow, with a description of how the advent of a canal, a colliery and a railway marks the beginning 
of ever-accelerating change. In 1964 the American critic, Leo Marx, published a significant study along 
similar lines. The book was called The Machine in the Garden. You might think that Marx was referring 
to the lawn mower, and in one way you would not be wrong. But the machine actually referred to is 
the railroad, which in the nineteenth century began to intrude upon what had been represented as a 
Garden of Eden. The machine begins to look something like a mechanical serpent. 
But it is not the replacement of the silent horse by the noisy tractor or train that I find disturbing. I am 
far from being a Luddite, and welcome technology when it is productive. Countless millions of people 
have been saved from starvation by mechanisation and modern engineering. What I find disturbing is 
the unproductive intrusion of noise upon both silence and speech. And I find this particularly alarming 
because not only is it so easily achieved, but it appears to be bringing about a reversal of values which 
have potentially disastrous consequences. 
What do I mean by the unproductive intrusion of noise upon silence? I mean, for example, the 
incessant strains of music from cheap radios and cassette players that fill the days and nights of the 
world from Subiaco to Broome, from Perth to Cairns, from Australia to Asia, Africa, Europe, and the 
Americas. With today's cheaply available technology, one need never listen to silence. 
I mean the hand-held cellular telephones that people with little imagination or sense of occasion like 
to put between them and their partner on the restaurant table as they go out to dinner together. That 
telephone contains an urgent message, which bleats repeatedly: I MIGHT BE NEEDED, THEREFORE 
lAM. 
I mean the unnecessary intrusion upon the silent parts of Australia's Outback-its deserts, its ranges 
of hills and mountains, its coastlines, its far too small National Parks. In the USA vast areas are off-
limits to any form of mechanised transport. By contrast, virtually all of Australia is freely open to off-
road vehicles so that we can drive where the original inhabitants walked. 
I mean, in other words, the growth of a culture that does not prize separateness, aloneness, isolation 
and even loneliness as a part of the human condition, as the other and necessary side of community. 
I mean a culture that considers silence to be a sign of failure, rather than a resource. I mean a culture 
that does not understand that its great achievements, as Yeats's poem tells us, are the movements of 
the mind "upon silence". 
Powerboats, portable telephones, unregulated off-road vehicles, ghetto-blasters, Walkmen and other 
intrusive technological innovations: they may seem irritating but trivial by-products of a technology that 
has brought untold benefits to the world. (Though the same technology, one should remember, has also 
brought us nuclear weapons, "smart bombs" and high-speed, pollution-free money laundering.) I 
would contend, though, that these apparently trivial consumer products, by virtue of their cheapness 
and consequent ubiquity, are not only a symptom' of the change in social values I am sketching here, 
but also a cause. 
Because we can always be in touch now, we are losing the art of switching off, of leaving the telephone 
and the radio and the portable CD player at home, of carrying our provisions in a backpack instead of 
in the back of the Toyota, and of being, for a while, voluntarily and gladly out of touch, out of reach. It 
is not technology that I deplore, but an attitude that technology has made possible. 
Why should this be so important? Let us consider the first conception of silence that I sketched here: 
silence as the utterance of truth. The death of this silence can be seen as the death of an idealism and 
a death of its consequent humility. One can put that another way and say that if silence is no longer 
regarded as the utterance of truth-even if this is a delusion, which I believe it is-then this is not the 
result of any great advance in the capacity of human speech. (In fact, so long as we allow technology 
to speak instead of us, it is more than likely that our capacity to be articulate will diminish.) Rather, it 
is an indication of a diminished conception of what truth might be, and a complacency with the 
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inadequacies of our expressive capabilities. A dimension of excellence will have vanished from our 
spectrum of values. 
The other conception of silence I sketched was silence as that which is productive of thought. This 
conception of silence likens it to the unconscious, as that which comprises a large and vital part of our 
subjectivity yet which can become conscious only by transgressing its condition of being not conscious, 
not spoken. Silence, seen this way, is that mute past out of which our thoughts-which are inevitably 
in some kind of language-emerge and are thus able to constitute our conscious self-both as 
individuals and as a culture. Silence is the total of the non-spoken or the unspeakable, the ground of 
thought and speech, upon which thought moves like Yeats's long-legged fly. This silence can therefore 
be regarded, in a Saussurean or Lacanian sense, as the Other, as that which speech is not, and against 
which speech, by its very difference, has to be constituted. When considered in this light, silence and 
speech, far from being antagonists, are the two necessary components of the duality which enables us 
to distinguish-to use the phrase of the American poet Emily Dickinson-"syllable from sound" 
(632: 12). 
The opposite of silence conceived/constructed in this way is not speech, but noise, which is the opposite 
of both. What we are witnessing today, I believe, is the relentless encroachment, upon all aspects of 
our mental and intellectual life, of noise. Think back for a moment to Yeats's poem. Can you imagine 
Caesar plotting his campaign with the telephones ringing and the computers chattering? Can you 
imagine Helen of Troy practising her "tinker shuffle" while listening to her ghetto-blaster? Or can you 
imagine Michelangelo painting the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel with the radio blaring beside him? If 
the truth be told, you probably can. But can you imagine Yeats, fifty years ago, or anyone in the whole 
history of humanity before perhaps the late 1950s, imagining it? Can you? Yet this is what we have 
today: the voluntary-and I want to stress that it is voluntary, which is what so worries me-the 
voluntary replacement of silence by noise. As everyone here knows, who has tried to talk in a crowded 
restaurant, the result is a lack of contrast, of precision, of clarity. Like the discoloured varnish on old 
paintings, noise tends to cancel out differences. And it is only by difference, as Saussure pointed out, 
that language can operate at all. If that silence vanishes, then a crucial degree of thoughtfulness will 
go with it. 
* * * 
What can we, in Australian universities, and in Edith Cowan University in particular, do about this? 
have no remedy: our culture is changing and nothing we do will stop it. But we can make ourselves, 
and our students, aware of the change, and of its nature. We can point to the value placed upon silence 
in the history of our culture-a value which is even greater within traditional Aboriginal culture. We 
can demonstrate how values central to our own world-Liberty, Imagination, a sense of community and 
a sense of individual dignity regardless of race and gender-received the shape and quality they still 
largely have because they were given them by people for whom silence was of importance. And we can 
point out that if silence disappears these values will either disappear too, or assume a different, and 
perhaps a lesser, form. 
The English Department at Edith Cowan University has good neighbours. We are part of the School of 
Language, Literature and Media Studies. (And its neighbours are the departments which comprise the 
School of Social and Cultural Studies-equally good neighbours.) Language Studies, which includes 
Applied Linguistics as well as the teaching of languages, and Media Studies are valuable allies indeed, 
because we all focus on language which, as I hope I have made clear in my talk this afternoon, can be 
a synonym for knowledge. Whether it be with regard to the spoken or written word, or to the multiple 
languages of image, music and speech employed by the non-print media, our knowledges complement 
each other. I hope that close cooperation among the three departments, and the two schools, will 
provide our students with an understanding of silence as I have discussed it here. If we can achieve 
this, we will be furnishing them with a means of enlarging, as well as of analysing and understanding, 
the world they will confront long after we have shuffled. In particular, I hope that collaboration by our 
departments will assist the identification and the bringing into speech of those who, because of gender, 
race, class or colonial subordination, have been silenced by dominant cultural forces. And I hope that 
collaboration will bring about new and exciting collaborative research to these ends. 
This mention of research brings me almost inevitably to a recurrent theme among researchers in the 
Humanities today. If I repeat it with a kind of weariness, it is not because I do not passionately believe 
in it, but because I wonder whether anyone is listening. A recent memo from the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor (Academic) stated quite accurately (and I quote): 
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The total of ARC (Australian Research Council) large grants awarded is the index used by the 
ARC in making allocations of other research monies to universities. That is, large ARC grants 
have a multiplier effect in that additional research monies from other ARC funds are 
automatically allocated to the university ... 
It is not recorded whether Caesar, Helen of Troy or Michelangelo ever received a "large" research grant. 
I suspect they did not. Nor did Plato, nor Wordsworth, nor Blake, nor Keats, nor Yeats. What they did 
receive was time to think and to write-inadequate as that often was. In other words, in certain areas 
of the Humanities-though not all, and certainly not in most other disciplines-the whole concept of a 
large research grant is not only irrelevant but ludicrous. In the Humanities, much research of value can 
be achieved without any research grant whatever, provided the university can provide the researcher 
some regular time and freedom from the babble of committees and the legitimate demands of students. 
In other words, the university must provide the researcher with a modicum of silence. This means 
rethinking research funding in the Humanities. It means lightening teaching loads, or at least 
rationalising them in areas where research grants are inappropriate; and it means providing periods of 
leave for intensive and sustained research. The cost to the university is small, the benefit to everyone 
enormous. The difficult task, of course, is to convince the ARC and the universities that excellence in 
research in the Humanities need not be measured by the financial cost of its achievement, but can be 
achieved as a result of the interaction of teaching and thinking. If this can be done, there will be less 
need for research grants in some areas of the Humanities, and research opportunities will be open to 
everyone who teaches, and not just to the lucky few who get grants. 
Let me end on a more personal note. In addition to being an academic, I write poetry. Numerous 
people have tried to define poetry, and none has done it successfully. But one thing distinguishes 
(most) poetry from prose, and that is the fact that the lines of poetry do not go all the way to the right 
hand margin. The result, when one reads poetry, is a momentary pause in the linguistic current, a 
recurring fraction of silence, before utterance begins again. This does not happen in prose, which has 
very little silence built into it. Whatever else poetry may be, it is speech and silence walking together, 
silence walking publicly and proudly with its voluble partner. Given what I have said about silence 
today, I hope you will appreciate therefore my hope that, when our students finish their study at Edith 
Cowan University, their attitude to the world will not be prosaic. 
We must acknowledge that our students will go into a world where silence can be avoided, and that it 
will be avoided by most people. But if we can teach our students the function, and therefore the value, 
of silence, I believe we will be teaching them much about the nature of knowledge. We will, quite 
simply, be teaching them to be thoughtful: and, in the next century, they may very well need to be just 
that. 
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